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 On the eve of the Peloponnesian War Perikles famously advised the Athenians 
how they could win (Thucydides 2.13.1-8). He reassured assemblygoers that they 
already had the required funds and armed forces for victor. The first corps that Perikles 
mentioned was the 13,000 hoplites. The next two were the 1200-strong cavalry and the 
1600 archers. The last corps of which he spoke was the navy of 300 triremes. This 
chapter’s aim is to go behind Pericles’s famous numbers. For each corps that he 
mentioned it studies the legal status of corps-members and their social background. 
The chapter explores how they were recruited into their corps and subsequently 
mobilised for campaigns. It establishes each corps’s history and organisation. By 
comparing all military branches this chapter reveals the common practices that the 
dēmos (‘people’) used to manage their armed forces. It explains the common 
expectations that they brought to this management.  
 
Hoplites 
 
 The hoplites of Classical Athens were divided into 10 taxeis or units. With 1 taxis 
for each of the 10 tribes a unit was often simply called a phylē or tribe (e.g. Lysias 
13.79). The division of Athenians into tribes was a reform of Kleisthenes.1 Soon after 
506 BC he divided Attica into 3 regions. In each region neighboring demes were 
grouped together into 10 trittyes (‘thirds’). A tribe had one trittys from each of the 3 
regions. The Athenians believed that Kleisthenes had made them stronger militarily 
(e.g. Herodotus 5.78-9). It is likely that a public army of hoplites was another of his 
reforms. Greek hoplites typically fought as part of a coalition army. When they did, 
those from a polis (‘city-state’) formed a distinct contingent. A contingent from 
Classical Athens was divided into phylai (e.g. Thucydides 6.101.3-5). In land battles 
Athenian hoplites thus always fought beside fellow phylētai (‘tribesmen’). In the 480s 
the Athenians created a board of 10 taxiarchs to command their hoplite taxeis. It was 
the taxiarchos who subdivided his tribe’s hoplites into lochoi or subunits (e.g. 
Aristophanes Acharnians 575, 1074). The number of a tribe’s lochoi varied in relation 
to how many hoplites Athens had put into the field.2  
The hoplites were the first branch of the armed forces that Perikles mentioned in 
his last pre-war speech (Thucydides 2.13.6-7). The 13,000 of them who were liable for 
active service were the largest corps after the navy. Pericles distinguished them ‘from 
both the oldest (hoi presbytatoi) and the youngest (hoi neōtatoi) and all the metics who 
were hoplites.’ This second group of hoplites normally only manned the city-walls and 
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 Page 2 
 
 
Attica’s forts. M. H. Hansen’s work on ancient Greek demography establishes that 
there were 60,000 citizens in 432/1.3 Certainly the neōtatoi were the precursors of the 
fourth-century ephebes, who were 18 and 19 year-olds ([Aristotle] Constitution of the 
Athenians 42.1-5). The presbytatoi were most probably 50 to 59 years of age.4 In the 
table of age-distribution that Hansen uses those aged between 20 and 49 years represent 
72.7 percent of adult males.5 In 432/1 the number of Athenians in this age-band was 
43,620. The 13,000 active-service hoplites therefore represented 29.8% of them.  
This 30% came from relatively prosperous families. Athens probably began to 
pay hoplites at the same time as it did sailors in the 470s. By 433/2 the regular misthos 
(‘pay’) for both was 1 drachma (‘dr.’) per day (e.g. Thucydides 3.17.4). Nevertheless 
each hoplitēs had to purchase his own equipment. This was not cheap because a shield 
and a spear cost up to 30 dr. and bronze armor up to 100 dr. His ownership of a slave 
is further evidence of his prosperity. Thucydides believed that every Athenian hoplite 
brought along a slave (e.g. 7.75.4). The Athenians judged it unsafe to arm slaves for 
land battles and so used them only as baggage-carriers. In Classical Athens it cost about 
200 dr. to buy a slave.6 Even for a skilled laborer, who earned 1 dr. per day, this was 
expensive. Unsurprisingly many poor citizens did not own a slave (e.g. Lysias 24.6).  
The old argument was that the telos of an Athenian determined the corps in which 
he served.7 In the 570s Solon had divided the Athenians into four such telē or income-
classes (e.g. [Aristotle], Constitution of the Athenians 7.3). Service as a hoplite, it was 
argued, was the duty of every member of his third lowest telos. This class, called 
zeugitai (‘yoke-men’), produced at least 200 medimnoi of agricultural produce.8 The 
top two telē were called ‘the 500-medimnoi men’ and the hippeis (‘horsemen’). It was 
long argued that they had to serve as, respectively, trierarchs and horsemen. Members 
of the lowest class, who were called thētes (‘hired laborers’), were free to volunteer to 
be sailors or archers. In the last twenty years the study of ancient Greek agriculture has 
refuted this old argument. H. van Wees puts beyond doubt that a zeugitēs needed 8.7 
hectares in order to qualify for his telos.9 Because Attica only had 96,000 hectares of 
arable land, there was simply not enough for all 13,000 active-service hoplites to be 
zeugitai. When van Wees factors in the land that the other income-classes owned, it 
emerges that the top three telē provided only one half of the hoplites. On the eve of the 
Peloponnesian War the other half were thētes. Telos-membership, it appears, played 
no role in the recruitment of hoplites.  
 Instead a non-elite Athenian probably simply chose whether he would be a 
hoplite, an archer or a sailor, when, as an 18 year-old, he was registered as a citizen in 
his deme. If he decided to be a hoplitēs, this choice was written beside his name in the 
lēxiarkhikon grammateion (e.g. IG i3 138.1-7), which was the register that a demarch 
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maintained of adult Athenians in his deme. Before a campaign each taxiarch drew up 
the katalogos (‘conscription list’) for his tribe (e.g. Aristophanes Peace 1173, 179-83). 
He got the names of conscripts by asking the demes in his phylē to nominate them (cf. 
[Demosthenes] 50.6). Commanders were not supposed to conscript hoplites who had 
recently served (e.g. Lysias 9.4, 15). Each tribe’s katalogos was displayed under the 
statue of its eponymous hero in the agora. The statues of the tribal demi-gods formed 
a monument that served as the state’s noticeboard. On display too was the date when 
the conscripts had to muster and where they had to do so (e.g. Aristophanes Birds 450). 
Most often they mustered in the athletics field of the Lyceum, which was just outside 
the city walls (see Chapter 22). But musters could also be held in, for example, the 
agora or the meeting place of the assembly on the Hill of the Pnyx (e.g. Andocides 
1.45). In the last two locations horoi (‘boundary markers’) have been found. Their 
inscriptions state that a trittys of a tribe ends and another trittys of the same tribe or the 
next tribe begins. These horoi presumably helped the taxiarchos to call the roll of his 
tribe.10  
 
Horsemen 
 
 The second corps that Perikles mentioned in his last pre-war speech was the 
cavalry (Thucydides 2.13.8). In 432/1 it consisted of 1000 hippeis (‘horsemen’) and 
200 hippotoxotai or mounted archers (Andocides 3.5). The hippeis, who were always 
citizens, were likewise divided into 10 tribal units. Each phylē of 100 horsemen was 
commanded by a phylarkhos or phylarch (e.g. Aristophanes Lysistrata 561-2). Two 
hipparkhoi (‘hipparchs’) commanded the corps as a whole (e.g. Birds 798-800). 
Hippeis were conscripted for a campaign in the same way as hoplites: their names were 
placed on a tribal katalogos. When he compiled a conscription list, however, a phylarch 
had access to what a taxiarch never did: a central record of hippeis (e.g. Lysias 16.13). 
Athens simply did not have enough secretaries to maintain a central record for 13,000 
hoplites, but could do so for the cavalry because of its much smaller size.  
 The cavalry-corps was most probably created in the 450s.13 Initially it had only 3 
units of 100 hippeis each (Andocides 3.5; IG i3 511). The Parthenon, which was 
completed by 438/7 BC, gives a firm date by which the cavalry had been expanded to 
10 units. This branch participated in the pompē (‘procession’) of the Great Panathenaia 
(e.g. Xenophon On the Cavalry-Commander 3.1-2), which was the focus of this 
temple’s north and south friezes. The Parthenon’s south frieze most clearly depicts 10 
distinct units of hippeis, which have different uniforms (Fig. 29.1). This is surely a 
depiction of the 10 tribes of the expanded corps.  
Serving as a horsemen was much more demanding than being a hoplite. Each 
hippeus had to buy his own warhorse and a horse for his slave hippokomos or groom 
(e.g. Xenophon On the Cavalry-Commander 2.6; 4.4; 5.6). The two horses probably 
cost him 500 dr. His service was also a full-time commitment because hippeis had 
constantly to train and always to be ready for deployment (e.g. 1.2, 5-6, 9-10, 18). This 
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training took place in or around the astu or urban centre (e.g. Aristophanes Knights 
119-20). Corps-members regularly paraded in the agora or, for example, in one or 
another of the athletics fields outside the city-walls (see Chapter 22). In order to find 
enough recruits for their expanded corps the dēmos decided to give them two subsidies. 
The first was a katastasis (‘setting-up loan’) so that a recruit could buy his warhorse. 
The second was a misthos of 2 dr. per day year-round. Because a hippeis needed only 
1 dr. for the fodder of his two horses,14 he could take home the same amount as a 
hoplite. 
 
[Use ½ a page or more to place Figure 29.1 about here.]  
 
 Solon’s income-classes played no role in the recruitment of horsemen.16 This 
explains why ‘hippeis’ in our sources are members of either his second highest telos or 
the cavalry.17 The term was never simultaneously used to describe both groups. Instead 
service as horsemen was a legal requirement of ‘those who were most able in terms of 
money and physical capacity’ (Xenophon On the Cavalry-Commander 1.9-12). Indeed 
hipparchs could compel 20 year-olds who met these criteria to join up. There was a 
very good reason for the first criterion. The 500 dr. that a hippeus had to spend on his 
horses was at least five times more than what a hoplite paid for his equipment. This 
was the equivalent of two years of wages for a skilled laborer. While the state lent him 
the money for his own horse, he had to pay this loan back after 10 to 15 years, when 
he retired from the corps. This would have been daunting to everyone except those who 
knew that they would inherit enough to cover a katastasis.  
 Therefore it is unsurprising that Aristophanes believed that all 1000 hippeis 
belonged to the elite (e.g. Knights 225, 266, 579-80, 842, 1369-72). Demography 
seems to confirm his belief.18 Horsemen were aged between 20 and 32.5 years. In the 
age-distribution table that Hansen uses they account for 37.2 percent. In 432/1 there 
were, in this age-band, 22,320, of which the 1000 horsemen were 4.5 percent. This is 
slightly less than the 5 percent of Athenians who were wealthy.19 Simply belonging to 
the elite made a physically fit young Athenian liable for cavalry service.   
The horses that the 200 mounted archers rode were owned by the state (e.g. Lysias 
15.5). After 412/11, when the dēmos began to reduce pay for the corps, the hippotoxotai 
always earned twice as much as the 1000 horsemen (e.g. fr. 6.73-81 Carey). This 
heavier subsidization suggests that the hippotoxotai were much less able to bear the 
cost of corps-membership. It strengthens the case that they did not belong to the elite 
(e.g. 15.6). Athenians certainly served as mounted archers (e.g. [Aristotle] Constitution 
of the Athenians 24.3). Nevertheless they did not serve beside the hippeis in the 10 
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tribes. Rather they formed their own unit under the direct command of a hipparch 
(Xenophon Memorabilia 3.3.1). We last hear of mounted archers in the 380s.  
 
Archers 
 
 In 432/1 the third corps that Pericles mentioned were the 1600 archers 
(Thucydides 2.13.8). The Athenians had no toxotai (‘archers’) at the battle of Marathon 
in 490/89. Because, ten years later, they could put such soldiers on their triremes at 
Salamis (e.g. Aeschylus, Persians 454-61), this corps must have been created in the 
480s. In 483/2 Themistocles convinced the Athenians to expand massively their public 
navy (Thucydides 1.14.1-2). The 200 triremes that they had after this shipbuilding was 
Greece’s largest public navy. Archers had a great deal to contribute on their decks: they 
could kill enemy rowers from a distance and help to stop any hostile boarding of their 
triremes. The dēmos probably saw archers as a good way to increase the military 
advantages that they sought. It is thus likely that they decided to create the archer corps 
as part of their naval expansion in the late 480s.  
 The Athenians in this corps were undoubtedly thētes because, as we will see, they 
had joined up as a way of escaping dire poverty.20 Nevertheless there is no evidence 
that their membership of this telos had made them liable for archer service. Toxotai 
presumably joined the corps on a voluntary basis as hoplites did theirs. The dēmos also 
created a board of toxarkhoi or archer-corps-commanders (e.g. IG i3 1186.20). Their 
corps’s small size allowed these commanders to maintain a central record of 
members.21 Toxarkhoi were required to draw up a katalogos of conscripts for each land 
or naval campaign (e.g. ML 23.23-6). Therefore conscription was common across the 
terrestrial branches of the armed forces. In other respects, however, the archer corps 
was differently organized. Many corps-members were actually metics.22 Because 
membership of a phylē, in Classical Athens, was a prerogative of citizenship (e.g. 
Lysias 23.2-3), the inclusion of metics ruled out the corps’s organization by tribes. 
Indeed it is not clear that toxotai even had regular units.  
 The dēmos may have understood the military advantages that their archer corps 
gave them (e.g. Andocides 3.70), but they still held archers in low regard. The 
Athenians believed that a brave man bore kindunoi (‘dangers’) in spite of the personal 
risk.23 In bearing them he accepted the possibility of death in battle. In land battles 
archers, by contrast, ran away, when the other side got too close (e.g. Thucydides 
2.79.6). Because they could shoot their arrows from a safe distance (e.g. 4.32.4), they 
bore much lower risks. This meant that archers appeared not to meet the popular 
definition of aretē (‘courage’). Playwrights and public speakers did not fail to point 
this out (e.g. Euripides Heracles 158-64, 187-204). Therefore the first reason why the 
dēmos esteemed archers to be lowly was that they judged them to be cowards. The 
second reason is that they saw archery as a predominantly barbarian mode of combat. 
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 For citizens as toxotai see e.g. Lysias 34.4; IG i31032.168-71.  
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In fact many or possibly even most of the metics in the archer corps were barbarians.24 
Athens also had a police force of 300 barbarians (see below). These dēmosioi (‘public 
slaves’) were armed as archers (e.g. Aristophanes Knights 65). In the eyes of the dēmos 
the main combat-mode of the Persians was archery (e.g. Aeschylus Persians 26, 29, 
147-8, 237-8, 278-9, 926).  
 The late M. Trundle rightly asked why some Athenians chose to be archers in 
spite of this low regard.25 The dēmos considered toxotai to be poorest branch of the 
army (e.g. IG i3 138.3-4). It is possible that what attracted citizens to it was pay and the 
fact that it cost less than hoplite service. But the same was the case with the navy. In 
addition the dēmos held sailors in much higher regard, seeing them as no less 
courageous than hoplites.26 Yet, the archer corps offered much better employment-
conditions.27 Athens required toxotai to be ready for immediate deployment and always 
to be practicing their perishable skill. To meet comparable requirements horsemen 
were employed full-time. There is good evidence that archers enjoyed the same 
conditions (e.g. [Aristotle] Constitution of the Athenians 24.1-2). Sailors, by contrast, 
earned pay only for their days on the high seas.  
 Here is the answer to Trundle’s good question: some poor Athenians chose to be 
archers because they needed full-time employment. Yet offering such steady jobs did 
not come cheaply. In 432/1 archers also earned 1 dr. per day (e.g. Thucydides 3.17.4; 
5.47.6). Consequently their misthos used up 10% of the state’s annual budget.28 After 
the Peloponnesian War Athens found it immensely difficult to pay for such recurring 
costs. By the time of the Corinthian War budget problems had forced the Athenians to 
disband the archer corps.  
The policing of Classical Athens was in the hands of 300 Scythian archers.29 The 
Athenians probably first purchased these dēmosioi in the mid-fifth century (e.g. 
Andocides 3.4-5). These archers were command by the executive committee of the 
democratic boulē (‘council’). Their main duty was to act as bouncers in the assembly. 
They moved citizens loitering in the agora towards the Hill of the Pnyx, when an 
assembly meeting was about to start (e.g. Aristophanes Acharnians 20-2). When the 
executive committee ordered them, they threw out unruly assemblygoers (e.g. 54). At 
other times they made arrests or stood guard in the agora or, for example, on the 
Acropolis (e.g. Aristophanes Lysistrata 397-475; IG i3 45.14-17). The last mention of 
this force occurs in a comedy of the 390s (Aristophanes Assembly-Women 143, 258-
9). 
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 E.g. Thucydides 8.98.1-2; IG i3 1172.35-7.  
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 Trundle 2010, 143-4.  
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Sailors 
 
The last forces that Pericles mentioned in his pre-war speech were the 300 
triremes (Thucydides 2.13.8). It was the duty of all citizens to fight for the state.30 In 
432/1 two thirds of them met this duty by serving in the navy. In the first several years 
of the Peloponnesian War Athens regularly had 20,000 sailors at sea simultaneously. 
The 200-strong crew of a standard Athenian trireme was divided into four groups. Two 
were the 4 toxotai and the 10 epibatai (e.g. Thucydides 2.23.1-2). The third group 
consisted of the 6 petty officers (e.g. IG i3 1032.35-46, 156-67). These officers were 
called collectively hē hypēresia (‘the assistance’) because they assisted the trierarch. 
The fourth group were the 170 nautai. The trireme got its name from the three levels 
of the benches on which these rowers sat. The dēmos judged that the thranitai, who sat 
on the top bench, contributed the most (e.g. Aristophanes Acharnians 162-3). A trireme 
had 62 top-bench, 54 middle-bench and 54 lower-bench rowers (Fig. 29.2).  
 
[Use ½ a page or more to place Fig. 29.2 about here.]  
 
 A trireme crew was led by a triērarchos (‘trireme-commander’). What 
differentiated this command from other forms of military service was the huge cost. 
The state left the recruitment of nautai to individual trierarchs. While it paid the misthos 
of sailors, triērarchoi that wanted the best of them paid more than this wage (e.g. 
[Demosthenes] 50.7). At sea trierarchs also paid for ship repairs and replacement 
rowers (e.g. 12, 15-16, 18, 23). The average attested cost of a trierarchy was 4436 dr.31 
Therefore it is easy to understand why the dēmos made the trierarchy one of the two 
liturgies that the wealthy were obliged to perform (e.g. Lysias 29.4). Each year the 
generals drew up a list of those who might be conscripted for the trierarchy.32 He who 
was conscripted was exempted from being so again for two years (e.g. Isaios 7.38). 
The wealthy thus met their military duty by alternately serving in the army and the 
navy. In order to keep track of his expenses a trierarch always maintained a detailed 
crew-list (Lysias 32.26). In 405/4 the dēmos honored the sailors of their eight triremes 
that escaped from Aegospotami.33 They did so by setting up a monument with their 
crew-lists. What survives of this stela provides the crew-lists of four of these warships 
(IG i3 1032).  
Epibatai were regular members of the hoplite corps who were serving in a fleet.34 
While marines were volunteers (e.g. IG i3 60.9-16), there still needed to be a roll call 
in order to ensure that all had kept their promise to serve. For the sake of this call the 
Athenians installed the same horoi in their naval harbor at Zea as they had in the other 
muster grounds for hoplites: trittys markers (IG i3 1127-31). If epibatai also embarked 
trittys by trittys, on a single trireme they should have come only from one phylē or two 
in the official order of the tribes. IG i3 1032 recorded the deme-names of citizen sailors. 
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Because a citizen’s deme determined his tribe, it lets us test this hypothesis. On each 
of this stela’s triremes the marines were scattered right across the tribes (25-9, 279-89, 
411). They, clearly, had not embarked by tribes. The employment of metics in the 
archer corps simply ruled out the use of tribes for embarking the conscripted toxotai.  
The most-important petty officer on a trireme was the kybernētēs or helmsman. 
He controlled the steering oars and so, with the help of the prōiratēs (‘bow officer’), 
navigated the trireme (e.g. Aristophanes, Knights 541-4). These 2 petty officers had 5 
deckhands each. The orders of the kybernētēs were relayed to the rowers by the 
keleustēs (‘rowing master’), who, along with the aulētēs (‘aulos player’), set the rowing 
speed (e.g. Euripides Helen 1575-6). The final 2 petty officers were the naupēgos 
(‘shipwright’) and the pentēkontarchos or pursuer (e.g. [Demosthenes] 50.18, 25). 
Without hē hypēresia a trireme could not function (Thucydides 8.1.2). The classical 
Athenians thus preferred to reserve these indispensable roles for fellow citizens (e.g. 
1.143.1). Their mobilization had two stages. In the first the state conscripted the 
required number of hypēresiai (e.g. 6.31.3). The second stage saw the trierarchs 
compete with each other to hire the best of these conscripts by offering bonuses (e.g. 
[Demosthenes] 50.5). Because this second stage ruled out any role for the phylai, it is 
unsurprising that each hypēresia on IG i3 1032 came from non-contiguous tribes (35-
46, 156-67, 290-301).  
Rowers were never formally recruited into the armed forces. Rather they simply 
turned up in the Piraeus, when a fleet was just about to depart. Trierarchs competed 
with each other to hire the best of these volunteers (e.g. Aristophanes, Acharnians 545-
54). Most of the nautai whom they hired were fellow Athenians (e.g. Thucydides 8.72-
89). Indeed from 433 to 426 there were normally 50% more Athenians in this branch 
of the armed forces than were required for the fleets of any particular year. In spite of 
this, a trierarch always had to hire non-citizens in order to find his 170 nautai. Most of 
these foreigners were metics, but others were simply from poleis (‘city-states’) in the 
Athenian empire (e.g. IG i3 1032.417-18, 71-104). While the Athenians never used 
slaves in land battles, they found that giving them an oar was safe. Therefore trierarchs 
also employed slave rowers.35  
Since these commanders relied on non-citizen rowers, many Athenian nautai 
clearly did not row every year. This suggests that their service-pattern was similar to 
hoplites and trierarchs: after serving in a fleet they had a rest for a year or two. The use 
of the market to mobilize rowers and the non-citizen status of many of them ruled out 
tribal organization. On each of the triremes of IG i3 1032 there were ‘citizen rowers’ 
from almost every phylē (3-13, 50-67, 172-211, 305-19).  
 
Conclusion: The Common Practices across the Armed Forces 
 
 In all branches Solon’s income-classes played no roles. It was simply the 
obligation of every citizen to serve in one branch or another. Non-elite Athenians were 
free to choose the corps that best suited them. Elite citizens did not have the same 
choice. The dēmos made it compulsory for them to serve as trierarchs. As young men 
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they were legally obliged to join the cavalry-corps. Telos-membership thus had no 
impact on an Athenian’s military obligation nor the branch in which he served. 
Conscription was also not limited to the top three income-classes. As many hoplites, 
for example, came from Solon’s fourth telos, their conscription-lists always included 
thētes. The dēmos did not expect to fight all the time. In their eyes a citizen who did so 
periodically fulfilled his duty to fight for the state. Therefore they granted hoplites who 
had recently served a legal right to a rest. They judged it enough for Athenian rowers 
to serve periodically. For every corps the Athenians created written records of those 
corps-members who were on a campaign. For the land forces corps- or unit-
commanders maintained these records. For the navy this responsibility generally fell 
to individual trierarchs. Tribal organization was a lot less common in the armed forces. 
Because membership of a tribe was a right that only citizens enjoyed, those corps that 
had non-citizens as members could not be so organized. The only Athenians who 
fought alongside fellow tribesmen were hoplites and cavalrymen.  
 
Further Reading 
 
This chapter summarizes Pritchard 2019, 28-137. For more on the hoplites see Christ 
2001 and Crowley 2012. On the horsemen see Pritchard 2018b and Spence 1993. For 
the archers see Pritchard 2018a and Trundle 2010, 145-52. On naval personnel see 
Gabrielsen 1994 and Pritchard 2018c.  
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Captions 
 
Figure 29.1: Horsemen ride in the procession of the Great Panathenaea that is depicted 
on the Parthenon. Relief block of the Parthenon frieze, 447/6-432/1 BC. Athens, 
Acropolis Museum, inv. no. 862. Photograph courtesy of H. R. Goette. 
 
Figure 29.2: The top-bench rowers and the three levels of benches on a trireme are 
depicted on fragments of a victory monument for the ship race at the Great 
Panathenaea. Attic marble relief, c. 410-400 B.C. Athens, Acropolis Museum, inv. no. 
1339. Photograph courtesy of H. R. Goette.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
